Maximus on Divinization: Not the actualization of a natural passive potency

From Amiguum 20. “The grace of divinization is completely unconditioned, because it finds no faculty or capacity of any sort within nature that could receive it, for if it did, it would no longer be grace but the manifestation of a natural activity latent within the potentiality of nature. And thus, again, what takes place would no longer be marvelous if divizination occurred simply in accordance with the receptive capacity of nature. Indeed it would rightly be a work of nature, and not a gift of God, and a person so divinized would be God by nature and would have to be called so in the proper sense. For natural potential in each and every being is nothing other than the unalterable movement of nature toward complete actuality. how, then, divinization could make the divinized person go out of himself, I fail to see, if it was something that lay within the bounds of his nature.”

What a slave to Aristotle.

On Reading Thomas

Thomas is always a joy to read. An ordering of the mind. A judicious approach, multifaceted and subtle yet not tangled and unruly.

Now and again, one tastes a bit of the angelic. Things in the world recede in their tumbling chaos. Not, mind you, to the loss of their detail. But their real being, their weight, and their true finality appears through the din of what would otherwise, deafening me, make lame my mind’s eye so that I could not feel all their stuff. Now and again, one of Thomas’s insights gathers one on high to taste this angelic stance, at once very human.

So it was, this morning, in reading his ‘On Judgment.’ Who would have thought, before turning these pages, that judgment is an act of justice? Not I. Often, Thomas is intuitive. Not this time. At any rate, he goes on to cite Aristotle: People seek refuge in a judge, as in a sort of living justice. (And so, this time, the insight is Aristotle’s. But who owns an idea anyway? We are all in the school. It is habits of mind, not ownership; truth, not persons, for which we are most eager.)

Reading this peculiar passage brought a recollection of things past: children’s voices raised in animosity. A dispute. An argument. Recourse! Recourse to whom? To a third party. To Mom or Dad. All those times that seemed so wearisome, so bothersome, …. All these now gathered together in the insight: people seek refuge in a judge. Why? They want a right saying. How consoling to read the Master and to have meaning found where one saw only chaos.

Nazianzus: Possible to Conceive the Essence First, then the Persons

In a recent article, I critiqued certain iterations of the "Social Analogy" and what I call the "I - Thou" argument for the Trinity. 

In the course of the argument, I noted my agreement with Bruce Marshall (see his fine essay on the Trinity in The Thomist, 2010) that, even in the East, theological reflection sometimes begins with the one essence and subsequently adverts to the distinction of persons. Prof. Marshall adduced some evidence; I adduced some evidence. I would point to another text in G. Nazianzus, from the commonly available English translations: "When we look at the Godhead, or the First Cause, or the Monarchia, that which we conceive is One; but when we look at the Persons in Whom the Godhead dwells, and at Those who timelessly and with equal glory have their being from the First Cause--there are Three Whom we worship." (Theological Oration on the Holy Spirit, par. 14). I take this statement as indicative of the macro-structure of the Theological Orations.

Concepts of Numbers? Consequences for the Synthetic A Priori?

Just what 'is' the concept of a number? Further, what is the relation of this concept to a picture image of the quantity that corresponds to the concept? 

When it comes to the number 3, one can easily picture some image representing the quantitative value of 3. But let's try 37. That's harder. However, if I am familiar with numbers, I can churn out an image representing the value. I can place 37 dots on the paper, for instance. Here, we have a relationship between some intellectual idea and a physical 'phantasm' as it were, which we can generate. The paper will have better memory than I; hence, I need paper or a slate. Whatever this idea of the number is, then, comprised therein is the 'rule' for creating the phantasm. (Here, let phantasm have its impression on a physical medium.) 

Now, it seems to me that in the rule regarding the construction of the phantasm for 37 is any set of rules for the generation of, say, factors and sets of numbers equalling the number 37. If so, included in the rule for the construction of an image of 37 is the rule by which I can judge that concept from which I can construct the image of 13 added to the image of 24, equals 37. The latter rule seems included in the very rule by which I churn out the phantasm for 37. So, if the number were 36, I'd include in the rules included in 36 also those of its interesting factors (those besides 1 and 36). 

Now, to say that in the concept 37 I do not see the concept "13 plus 24" seems correct at first sight. If it is correct and yet our judgment of its truth is necessary, it seems that we have a synthetic a priori judgment. 

However, I suggest that whatever darkness lies between the concept 37 and the concept 13 + 24 is similar to the darkness that lies between the concept 37 and the very rule whereby I construct the image of 37. Just what is this latter relationship? 

In short, if it is correct that the concept "13 plus 24" is not included in 37, then, similarly, the rule for generating the image of 37 is not in the concept 37. But is it not obviously false that the rule for generating the image of 37 is not in the idea of 37, whatever an idea of 37 is? Would not all agree that the rule for generating the image of 37 is most certainly in the idea of 37? The alleged difficulty of finding in the concept 37 the concept 13+24 is really indistinguishable from the difficulty of finding the phantasm of 37 without the process of executing the rule. From the concept 37 I cannot perceive at once the image representative of 13+24.

However, I clearly do grasp from 37 the rule for the construction of the image of that quantity. Similarly, I grasp the various sets of rules tucked in the number; or I can acquire the habit of such knowledge; or I can work it out case by case, just as I work out case by case the image of the quantity 37 or 43 or 317. 

What does this matter? If it is claimed that the way I grasp the necessity of the rules regarding the parts of 37 is that of a 'synthetic a priori judgment', I respond by saying that the way I grasp the necessity of the rule regarding the creation of its phantasm is a 'synthetic a priori judgment.' But would anyone grant that one grasps the relation of a rule to the idea of a number by way of synthetic judgment? If few would, why would not few also agree that the relations of the concepts need not be grasped by synthetic judgment but rather that analytic judgment is what occurs? Further, if the relation of my concept of a number to the rule generating its image is grasped by synthetic judgment, what in fact would be linked in the judgment except a symbol and a rule? My concept becomes simply a symbol. Would all concepts vanish? Perplexity. What are the relations between concept, symbol, and the various rules? What is the concept of a determinate number?

The constructive character of arithmetic here certainly includes the relationship of concept to phantasm. Insofar as phantasm is required for insight, one can say that this constructive character is constitutes a dispositional condition for the growth in ideas, as one enters the science. I think the science of classical geometry follows a similar pattern. 

New Natural Law Ill Equipped for PRACTICAL Task of Legislation

My thesis question is this: Is it not the case that the New Natural Law approach to the Moral Object is badly suited for the practical task of pro-life legislation? 

All Catholics ought to be pro-life. But the pro-life stance involves the will and the effort to achieve legislation protecting the unborn. This is achieved by laws against abortion.

Now, on the New Natural Law approach, we supposedly don’t know if an act of in-utero-child-death-dealing really is murder, really is abortion, until we ask the agent what her / his intention is. So the NNL approach contends: Only if the agent proposes to himself / herself “I seek the death of the child,” then the act constitutes directly procured abortion and should thus be punishable by law.

But if the agent proposes to himself / herself “I seek only the removal of the child,” then – on this account – the act does not constitute direct abortion but simply “removal of the fetus.”

In the latter case, the New Natural Law analysis does have further questions; chiefly, Is there “proportionate reason” to remove the fetus? If not, the act is not justified. If so, the act is justified. The NNL analysis then submits that if the mother were to die unless the fetus is removed, there is proportionate reason. A fortiori, the argument goes, is there proportionate reason if both mother and fetus were to die unless the fetus is removed.

What is the upshot? The upshot is that on the New Natural Law account, pro-life legislation would require examination of the intention of the agent.

Now, it is notoriously difficult for a human tribunal to discover with moral certitude the intentions of an agent. Sometimes these intentions are shown in evidence. Example: Someone plotting a death in writing leaves evidence of First Degree culpability. But just what would be the way in which one might reliably, for the most part, determine the intention of the agent seeking or providing abortion? What could be done if someone simply claimed to have "proposed" to himself / herself that the action is "removal"? Further, would every abortion provider be examined, after each abortion, concerning what his / her proximate intentions were? 

Clearly, the New Natural Law approach is on this score very ill-suited to practical application. This is ironic, since practical application is one of the leading reasons suggested in defense of NNL. Even some who eschew the theory tolerate it – or donate to its richly endowed foundations - because of its purported applicability, its status as receivable public argument. But here, practical political application seems doomed to a bad fate.

Is this fate not definitional to the NNL approach? For, as Steven Long has argued, NNL denies the basic point that some actions have per se effects and that for any agent intelligently to propose to commit the action just is to propose to bring about these per se effects.

Consequently: Let the money go to the Traditional Natural Law. 

Separation and the River Forest Debate

The suggestion may be naive. Here 't goes. The debate is well known. Is proof of the existence of a being that cannot be material required before the separatio of being from matter can be achieved? Gilsonians say no; River Forest / Laval Thomism says yes. 

Remark: The Platonists seem to have a valid argument for The One from the many. (Though perhaps someone will dispute this. I find it compelling.) Yet, they reject the predicates "Being" and "Intelligence", etc., for The One. 

Thus, the question: Is it even sufficient to infer The One in order to determine the freedom of some perfection from limitation? 

Third Way

Thomas's Third Way bears remarkable resemblance, at least broadly, with an argument in Richard of St. Victor, De Trinitate, Book I, chaps. 6-8. 

Hume or Us

Reading Hume's Treatise again, I was startled by his subtlety. For Hume is quite the writer. Indeed, many distinctions up front. More to come after one has anticipated, by objection, exceptions to the terms and definitions previously laid out. 

Most importantly, he comes at the issue of our sense of causality numerous times. And from various angles. However, he comes at the issue far more times than, it seems to this perhaps naive reader, the angles he has on the issue. 

And then he comes at it again, time and again. 

After this becomes a bit amusing, one reads: "I am sensible, that of all the paradoxes, which I, have had, or shall hereafter have occasion to advance in the course of this treatise, the present one is the most violent, and that 'tis merely by dint of solid proof and reasoning I can ever hope it will have admission, and overcome the inveterate prejudices of mankind."

Comment: So it will be by 'reasoning and proof'. Now, what 'reasoning and proof' is going to be offered? He basically holds that necessary connections are those which obtain between ideas, and contingent connections are those that obtain between things. So, are we going to discover in our idea of "causality" the predicate "constant conjunction of two items"? Is he about explaining to us the concept of causality? Then we would come to a certain conclusion. If this will not take place, how shall we learn and accept his notion of causality?

Back to the text: "Before we are reconcil'd to this doctrine, how often must we repeat ourselves, that the simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us any idea of power, or of a connexion betwixed them: that this idea arises from the repetition of their union: that the repetition neither discovers nor causes any thing in the objects, but has an influence only on the mind, by that customary transition it produces: that this customary transition is, therefore, the same with the power and necessity; which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are internally felt by the soul, and not perceiv'd externally in bodies?" 

Indeed, if we cannot find the truth of the Humean concept by burrowing into the notion of causality, if he hammers it home to us repeatedly throughout the Treatise, we might eventually become accustomed to accepting it. But alas, nature and culture seem against Hume's task: "I am much afraid, that tho' the foregoing reasoning appears to me the shortest and most decisive imaginable; yet with the generality of readers the biass of the mind will prevail,and give them a prejudice against the present doctrine." 

The efficacity of Hume's labor, on the other hand, astonishes. And how quickly many were universally to apply this "concept" to the many different instances of what cannot be the same but only like. I have a sense he is smiling as he writes. Humorous. 

But once we accept this labor, we immediately reason with him, readily (within 10 pages), to those absurd or paradoxical beliefs such as (1) all causes are the same (i.e., but sine qua non), (2) something can just 'pop' into being w/o any cause (why not?), (3) anything may produce anything, (4) a set of logical rules utterly devoid of consideration of essences - geared rather to statistic / correlational appreciation of otherwise coincidental happenings, (5) that animals reason just as we do, (6) that we are but bundles of properties (good luck finishing the book), (7) that we cannot have reason to believe that X exists if we can't form an idea of X (idea being an image). 

So, what is it: Hume or Us?

Vatican Clarification on Filioque

The PCPCU published in 1995 a text on the Filioque entitled “The Filioque: A Clarification”. It has good points. Yet, it is not without reason for criticism. Zizioulas among the Orthodox has criticized it. D. Coffey among the Catholics has criticized it (and quite well and incisively I might add).

I’d like to add a few minor observations.

First, the document speaks of the conflict between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. This is the usual way in which the conflict is put. And it is understandable. However, it is not accurate.

The conflict is between the Catholic Church and the Orthodox churches. The Catholic Church is both Eastern and Western in terms of her theology and rites. (Both churches are Eastern and Western geographically.) Thus, we have an important ecclesiological correction to make to this picture. For there is but one true Church of Christ, and that is the Catholic Church. I consider that it is high time for ecumenical niceties to be sobered by realism. We cannot continue not to express the “fullness of the faith”. Part of that fullness is that there is also an exclusiveness. One true religion, etc.

Second, the document claims, “The Holy Spirit, therefore, takes his origin from the Father alone (ek monou tou Patros) in a principal, proper, and immediate manner” [Footnote Thomas Aquinas: ST Ia, q. 36, art. 3, ad 1.] This claim is problematic for two reasons.

We grant that the Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father, in the technical sense. That means, the Father is his principal without principal. It is not that the Spirit proceeds “less” from the Son. But that the Son, his principal, is himself from a principal. In short, the teaching here shores up the monarchy of the Father.

But it is odd to say that the HS proceeds from the Father alone in a “proper” manner. Is this opposed to an “improper” manner? Does it mean the term “proceeds” should not be linked to the Son? Does it mean that “proceeds” means only coming from an ultimate principal? Why then should the document include the expression “proceeds (ekporeuetai) from the Father through the Son?” Wouldn’t that be oxymoronic? Or is “proper” simply a redundant synonym for “principal”? These are questions.

Most important, however, is the misreading given to Thomas. The text aims to imply that the Spirit does not proceed “immediately” from the Son. (Or else this “alone” is part of a complex and thus misleading statement. Read as complex, it would mean: “Simply b/c the HS is from the Father alone in a principal way, therefore we can truly say HS is from the Father alone in a principal and immediate manner, although he is not from the Father alone in an immediate manner. Misleading to say the least!)

Thomas’s text is in response to obj. 1. Objection 1 contends: If the HS is “from the Father through the Son” then he is not immediately from the Father, which is false. So, the response is aimed precisely at that statement. Now, even the good Fathers of the English Dominican Providence have a translation that may be seen to ‘tilt’ in the direction the Clarification takes. However, Thomas only states the following in his response: (1) HS is from the Father immediately as from him; and (2) He is from the Father (this is understood in the Latin more clearly) mediately as from the Father through the Son. Thus, Thomas is not denying that the HS is from the S immediately. In fact, his entire theology contends he is from the S immediately.

On First Principles: That There be Some Informative Ones

Are there any substantive first (i.e. self-evident) principles? Substantive meaning informative: neither tautology nor mere principles of formal logic.

Some argue that there are none, that there can be none: Any given principle is either substantive or self-evident (exclusive disjunct).

The reason given is that in order to be grasped as self-evident, the principle must be so close to the Principle of Contradiction that it is practically a repetition of this principle. All such propositions are easily grasped as being necessarily true, and just as equally uninformative.

Conversely, all statements that are truly informative require, to be understood and affirmed as true, some theoretical framework which renders the principles grasped only within the framework to be hypothetical. Every such proposition is open to possible falsification (or further ratification) as the inquiry continues. Hence, no such proposition could be affirmed to be necessarily true.

I maintain that the above disjunct is not absolute. I suggest the following two arguments demonstrate that it is not absolute. The first is that the affirmation that this disjunct is absolute requires in practice the denial of the truth of the disjunct. The second is that some there are in fact some substantive self-evident principles.

First: If it were true that there are no substantive self-evident principles, one could not affirm with certainty that there is none. This is shown impossible on the very terms of the disjunct.

This proposition itself – Any given principle is either substantive or self-evident – is informative. It is not a practical repetition of the Principle of Contradiction. Therefore, if it were true, no one could affirm it to be true necessarily. Instead, one would have to wait for its further verification, or falsification, in which case one could not lay it down apodictically. Or, conversely, if one grasped that it—an instance of an informative proposition—is necessarily true, one would demonstrate that it—there are no substantive self-evident principles—is false.

Second: There exist seemingly mundane, but to me marvelous, truths of the perennial philosophy which are both informative and necessarily true. For example: Every animal moves itself. Informative because motion and animal are not the same concept, for the living mind (not the computer) thinks the one thing in aspects (and does not merely bundle properties). For example: Every man is risible. Informative because laughing and man are not the same concept. However, in the concept man we have the distinct ideas of rational and animal. Who is rational but of limited intelligence can grasp what is in place and can be befuddled at what is out of place. Who is animal has lungs and a voice box. Thus, who is both rational and animal has wherewithal bodily to express befuddlement: Can laugh. These truths do not yield supercomputers. But they are instances of real insight into a real world. And the discovery of these truths is just that, progress and discovery. It is progress to grasp what “animal” is and what “rational” is. Insights into reality. It is progress to put these insights together rationally. It is progress to come to a conclusion. Therefore, although these statements are analytic, so to speak, yet they exhibit real progress in our knowledge of the real.

Last piece of evidence in this brief: Consider the progression from Q. 2 of the Prima pars through Q. 11 of the same. Deductions that are informative, resting on inductions that are non-hypothetically penetrating.