Matthew Dugandzic’s paper, “The Passio Corporalis and the Passio Animalis in Aquinas,” argues that even though Thomas omits discussing the distinction between the passio corporalis and the passio animalis in his “lengthiest and most mature treatment of the passions, the so-called ‘Treatise on the Passions’ in the Prima Secundae,” it is actually very important, especially forAquinas’ understanding of Christ’s suffering. One important point Dugandzic raises is that passio animalis cannot be confounded with a passio animae as doing so would imply that pain is a passio animalis. Were that the case, however, the conclusion that Christ did not truly suffer would seem to follow necessarily, Dugandzic argues. Some authors think that the mature Aquinas came to think that the “corporalis-animalis” distinction was not helpful. Dugandzic rather convincingly argues, however, that it was not the case that he came to think of it as unhelpful. To the contrary, Thomas especially uses it to enumerate and analyze the ways in which Christ suffered and, for that reason, although it is not found in the Treatise on the Passions, it is found in other later works.
Dugandzic does, however, grant that Aquinas refined his view of the passion of pain in order to refute Hilary, who had argued that Christ did not feel pain. In short, the later Thomas thought of the pain Jesus endured as a passion of the sensitive appetite and not just as a sensation, which enabled the Angelic Doctor to highlight the intensity of His suffering. Dugandzic’s related discussion of the hylomorphic unity of body and soul and the proper way of understanding the passio animalis and the passio corporalis on this point is certainly worthwhile.
In the article, “Aquinas on Relations: A Topic Which Aquinas Himself Perceives as Foundational to Theology,” Whitfield rightly points out that Thomas believed the topic of relations is necessary for providing the foundations of many important topics (e.g., the Divine persons, creation, and the Incarnation). Whitfield especially focuses on the topic of mixed relations in this article, though, because of its importance in understanding the way all things are ordered to God. The article is divided into two parts. The first provides an overview of the “nature and types of relation as understood by Aquinas and inherited from Aristotle,” and the second explores mixed relations in particular since they are the relations that must exist between God and creatures.
In the first part, Whitfield does an excellent job of providing an overview of relation, which Aquinas described as an accident that affects the subject intrinsically “whose proper being consists in being toward another.” In other words, it is different from absolute accidents (such as the color of a substance) that pertain to the subject itself because it inheres in another. Whitfield ably produces pertinent quotations from Emery and Svoboda to explain this in further detail. He then discusses the conditions of a relation (namely, that there must be a subject, term, and foundation of the relation) and the types of relations (real and logical).
In his treatment of mixed relations, after admitting that relations are usually symmetrical--“either both being real (as in the case of fatherhood and sonship) or both logical (as with a man’s theoretical future fatherhood and the corresponding future sonship/daughterhood),”--Whitfield explains why there must be asymmetrical (i.e., mixed) relations between the Creator and the creature. In this case, “the relation from one side is an accident really inhering in one extreme, while the corresponding relation with regards to the other extreme exists only in the mind.” Interestingly, Thomas likens mixed relations to the relationship between knowledge and the known object. Whitfield goes on to provide a cogent explanation of the reason why creatures have a real relation to God even though God only has a logical relation to creatures. After providing some important clarifications pertaining to relations of reason by contrasting Aquinas with Ockham, he concludes by emphasizing the importance and well-nigh indispensability of understanding relation in order to read Aquinas well.
In “Thomas Aquinas on Human Beings as Image of God,” Henk J.M. Schoot makes use of a manipulated photograph known as “The Missing Person” to explore St. Thomas’s teaching regarding human beings being made in the Image of (the Triune) God. The photograph is the product of Ger van Elk who was a member of the conceptual art movement, that Schoot explains was intended to make the invisible visible. Given that creatures come to know God through His effects and that man is a special kind of effect since he is made in His image, it is understandable that Schoot thought of using the photograph to discuss Thomas’s teaching on the image of God in man. For particulars regarding the photograph, I will let the reader view the article rather than describing its import for the article here.
Schoot begins with introductory remarks pertaining to the first chapter of Genesis that provide the foundation for Thomas’s teaching. Although he says the verse that says man is made in God’s image is preeminently worthy of reflection, he goes on to suggest there may be truth to the notion that “humankind as image of God is in fact part of an obsolete vision that is responsible for humankind exploiting and damaging the natural world.” He says Thomas himself would not consider “human beings as ruler (sic) of what is placed under them” and that Aquinas would not say “humankind is meant to exercise dominion.” This is an unfortunate assertion for a variety of reasons. First, because Aquinas insists that Sacred Scripture, which in this case plainly teaches that God gave dominion to man over “every living thing” (Gn. 1:28), is without error (I, q. 1 a. 10 ad 1 & ad 3; see III, q. 31 a. 3 s.c.). Secondly, because Thomas’s appreciation of reason, which distinguishes man from beasts (I, q. 3 a. 1 ad 2; q. 93 a. 3), was so great that he said “man should be master over animals” and lesser creatures since “the imperfect are for the sake of the perfect” and since “Divine Providence… always governs inferior things by the superior”(I, q. 96 a. 1).
Having said that, the article is by no means devoid of value. Schoot goes on to explain Thomas’s insight by first discussing analogy, similitude, and image in particular and then summarizing the teaching of Thomas by insisting that it is a central concept in the Summa. By way of introducing analogy, he points out that “for understanding and naming [God] there are two ways of knowing and speaking available: the way which leads from the created to the Creator, and the other way around, the way that leads from the Creator to the created.” He calls the first way philosophical and the second theological and argues that, in either case, human language falls short since we cannot know what God is, “only what He is not” (I, q. 3). For this reason, the “unity of God and human beings” is “only according to analogy or proportion.”
Schoot proceeds to give a readable and accurate account of question 93 of the Prima Pars that should prove valuable for anyone who has not read it and wants an overview. He also provides the reader with a substantial section of a marvelous sermon St. Thomas gave on the imago Dei. The article is worth reading for that sermon alone, but Schoot’s explanations and insights (with the exception of the portion critiqued above) are sure to provide readers with even greater insight into its value.
