Objective and Subjective Sin

Does anybody know where and when the widespread use of the distinction between objective and subjective sin was introduced?  I can find plenty of medieval and modern distinction between perfect and imperfect acts, and between human and non-human acts.  For instance, there is a lot on how somebody who sleeps with another's wife does not commit adultery if he does not know that she is married to another.  But I can't find anything about how someone who knowing sleeps with another's wife might not really be committing adultery.  There has to be something in the literature.  I have seen several statements like "The Church teaches that adultery is objectively wrong, but not always subjectively sinful."  I can see why it might not be sinful if it is not formally adultery, but I don't think that this is what they are saying.

I've looked around a bit in different descriptions of why we shouldn't judge others.  There are obvious remarks on how it is not our place, how we lack the relevant knowledge, etc.  It is like one servant judging another.  There is also material on how we might not know circumstances that would mitigate or change the act.  But most medieval and early modern authors seem to assume that if someone knowingly murders or commits adultery, we can know that they sinned mortally.  Augustine states that we should then reflect on the fact that they might repent, and we might be damned, etc.  The general approach seems to involve a combination of some of at least four elements: 1) don't judge if you don't need to because it is not your place, 2) you cannot know all the relevant circumstances, especially of acts that are not intrinsically evil, 3) even if you know that the neighbor's act is mortally sinful, you don't know if it is merely on account of weakness or ignorance instead of malice, and 4) you don't know that the person will repent and become a great saint, whereas you might be damned.  I don't find any suggestions that we should consider that our neighbor is not in fact sinning by committing adultery, blasphemy, or murder.  In other words, nobody says, "You can know that your neighbor is choosing to commit objectively evil actions such as murder or blasphemy, but you can't know that he is subjectively guilty."  Where does this come from historically?  Please send an e-mail or comment if you have citations from before the twentieth century that don't have to do with the formal/material distinction, or even if you know of anything that suggests the possibility of invincible ignorance concerning the substance of the Ten Commandments.

Amoris Laetitia: Misquoting St. Thomas on Rules

There is another misuse of St. Thomas, this time on rules.  It is in a section called "Rules and Discernment."

The document quotes Thomas to justify exceptions to"rules," as if the natural law concerning sexual relations did not involve exceptionless negative precepts.  The document lacks a basic understanding of Thomas's view of how rules are applied to particular situations.  

Consider this quote: 304.
It is reductive simply to consider whether or not an individual’s actions correspond to a general law or rule, because that is not enough to discern and ensure full fidelity to God in the concrete life of a human being. I earnestly ask that we always recall a teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and learn to incorporate it in our pastoral discernment: “Although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects… In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles; and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all… The principle will be found to fail, according as we descend further into detail”.347 It is true that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations. At the same time, it must be said that, precisely for that reason, what is part of a practical discernment in particular circumstances cannot be elevated to the level of a rule. That would not only lead to an intolerable casuistry, but would endanger the very values which must be preserved with special care.

347 Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 94, art. 4.

The document seems to conflate rules such as "You shalt not commit adultery" with rules such as "Return borrowed items."  But consider this statement: "It is true that general rules set forth a good which can never be disregarded or neglected, but in their formulation they cannot provide absolutely for all particular situations."  In this case it seems to confuse rules such as "You shall not commit adultery" or "You shall not murder" with rules such as "Love God," "Help others, "Give alms."   I first thought that the passage was discussing primary and secondary precepts.  But then it seems to be discussing the difference between rules that oblige semper and ad semper and those that oblige semper and not ad semper.  Which does it mean?  And how are either relevant to the issue at hand?

For clarifying these issues, it is might be helpful to look at a good book on Moral Philosophy, such as Ralph McInerny's Ethica Thomistica.  
 

Amoris Laetitia: Misquoting St. Thomas on Irregular Relationships?

There is an interesting quote from St. Thomas in the new exhortation Amoris Laetitia.  Unless I am mistaken, it follows the trend of much neo-Modernist "scholarship" by misquoting St. Thomas in favor of a political or religious goal.  Thomas discusses the difficulty that some saints have in spite of their virtuous habits.  It seems to be used in the exhortation as evidence that those who commit reproductive acts in irregular situations might not be guilty of mortal sin.  I have no idea what sort of argument or interpretation might cause one to interpret Thomas's comments in favor of this view.  Apart from what the document actually says, there seems to be an egregious misuse of St. Thomas. 

Here is the passage:

 For an adequate understanding of the possibility and need of special discernment in certain “irregular” situations, one thing must always be taken into account, lest anyone think that the demands of the Gospel are in any way being compromised. The Church possesses a solid body of reflection concerning mitigating factors and situations. Hence it is can no longer simply be said that all those in any “irregular” situation are living in a state of mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace. More is involved here than mere ignorance of the rule. A subject may know full well the rule, yet have great difficulty in understanding “its inherent values”,339 or be in a concrete situation which does not allow him or her to act differently and decide otherwise without further sin. As the Synod Fathers put it, “factors may exist which limit the ability to make a decision”.340 Saint Thomas Aquinas himself recognized that someone may possess grace and charity, yet not be able to exercise any one of the virtues well;341 in other words, although someone may possess all the infused moral virtues, he does not clearly manifest the existence of one of them, because the outward practice of that virtue is rendered difficult: “Certain saints are said not to possess certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, even though they have the habits of all the virtues”.342

 341 Cf. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 65, art. 3 ad 2; De Malo, q. 2, art. 2.

342 Ibid., ad 3.

The quotes from St. Thomas have nothing to do with the issue under discussion, and seem to be merely manipulated to support a very different position.   Apart from any religious reservations a believer might have about the paragraph, Thomists should be very worried about the misuse of Thomas's texts for political and religious reasons.

I am willing to believe or at least accept anything in such documents that is not obviously wrong.  But the use of St. Thomas in this passage is embarrassing.  Or am I missing something?

ADDITIONAL BUT ONLY PARTLY RELATED COMMENT

Incidentally, is this document claiming that Christians can be sometimes be free of guilt on account of invincible ignorance of the Ten Commandments?  I have seen this in some recent preaching and writers, but not so clearly in other official documents, and never (or almost never) before the twentieth century.     There is an isolated passage from St. Thomas that some have argued proves that there can be invincible ignorance of fornication (De Malo, q. 3, art. 8).  But here he has not yet described the different kinds of voluntary and involuntary ignorance, and is merely distinguishing between ignorance concerning the deformity of the act (such as ignorance that fornication is a sin), and ignorance of the circumstances, (such as that someone is not one's wife).  Interpreting this article as in favor of invincible ignorance of fornication at least seems to conflict with other passages such as:  De Veritate, q. 17, art. 3; l I-II, q. 6, art. 8; I-II, q. 19, art. 5-6;  I-II, q. 77, art. 7, ad 2. But the exhortation seems to be stretching this invincible ignorance to Catholics, and to adultery.

Thomism and Indissolubility of Marriage at Trent

Concerning divorce and remarriage, in addition to the texts cited by Brugger, it is interesting to look at some passing treatments by moral theologians.  Gonet discusses the matter of Pani's article, which is the relation of the Greeks to Trent, sess. 24, can. 7 de matrim, in Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, vol. 5, tract. 8, disp. 5, art. 3, nn. 61-62 (Antwerp, 1725, p. 530).   This text is available on the PRDL site.

Pruemmer, in his Manuale Theologiae Moralis, Pars II, tract. 10, cap. 3, art. 2, n. 62, notes that some hold that the indissolubitiy of a consummated Christian marriage is certain, it lacks the certitude of faith.  Nevertheless, it is heretical to say that the church errs when it taught and teaches that the bound of marriage cannot be dissolved by the adultery.  Consequently, those who reject the doctrine are at least "in errore proximo haeresi."  He deals with Trent and the Greeks in a footnote. 

Double Standard for Modernist Scholarship?

It seems to me that recently in Catholic intellectual life we have seen in some circles a complete subordination of scholarship to the neo-Modernist agenda.  This subordination is not entirely new, but it seems to me more extreme and explicit.  Two cases stick out: Adriano Oliva's Amours, and Giancarlo Pani's La Civilita Cattolica article on marriage at the Council of Trent.   Again, such a politicization and degradation of scholarship is not entirely new.  Oliva is building on a long tradition of secular politicized scholarship concerning homosexuality, which can be seen in the work of John Boswell, and was reflected in the public shenanigans of Martha Nussbaum ( http://linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9609/stand.html).  Pani is in part drawing on a twenty-year tradition of neo-Modernist moral theology.

It seems to me that Catholic scholars with neo-Modernist leadings can get away with shoddy work in a way that is similar to how politically-minded scholars generally can get away with such work in the secular context.  Is there an increasing double standard?  I can't think of recent parallel instances where tradition-minded established scholars or respected public intellectuals similarly misuse scholarship or rely on scholarly credentials to further their agenda, but I could very well be wrong.  

I would love comments on the following questions: Is there a double standard?  Are there other instances of it, such as in ecumenical dialogue?  Or is it just the result of my recent reading of Oliva?   

Maybe it is just a lot more common in theology, and I have been reading more theology lately.

For Pani's article, see:

http://www.laciviltacattolica.it/it/quaderni/articolo/3461/matrimonio-e-%C2%ABseconde-nozze%C2%BB-al-concilio-di-trento

and a helpful rejoinder in

http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/10/13934/

Current Events Almost Prove Thomistic Thesis

In the recent excitement over the Pope's recently reported comments on the plane, nobody has noted a perhaps more interesting but less practical point, which is that, if Fr. Lombardi is correct, a historical event has tilted a scholastic debate. 

I am taking the formulation from the Collegium Salmanticensis, C.T., De Fide, Dips. 4, dub. 1, nn. 5-7 (Palme, vol. 11, pp. 250-252).

The question: An Pontifex ut Doctor particularis gaudeat eadem indefectibilitate circa res Fidei, et an possit absolute errare circa objecta secunda generis, quae supra descripsimus?

Albertus Pighius was thought to be the first to hold this position, although others such as Bellarmine and Suarez responded negatively as well, at least with respect to errors concerning things of faith, and "cum contumacia."

The Carmelites and Banez (as well as the preceding tradition?) hold that Summus Pontifex ut doctor particularis potest errare non solum circa objecta secundi generis, sed etiam circa res fidei, et non solum errore inculpabili proveniente ex ignorantia, aut negligentia, sed etiam cum contumacia, ita ut sit haereticus.

With respect to the kinds of objects,  "Pontifex ad duo objectorum genera comparari valet: ad res fidei, ad bonos Ecclesiae mores, aliaque hujusmodi, quae pertinent ad commune ovium sibi creditarum salutem."  The others concern the faith in some other way.

The plane conference was ut doctor particularis.  If Fr. Lombardi is correct, it also involved matters belonging to the first category (grave matter).  Consequently, the second opinion would be proved up to the point "non solum circa objecta secondi generis," but NOT from "et non solum errore . . ."   Could this be right?

2/29/2016 Response to Comment

It is clear to me that the position that Fr. Lombardi attributes to the Pope would qualify with respect to its content, but it is perhaps uncertain to me that the Pope really said it, or, if he did, whether he holds it cum contumacia.  As was discussed previously, according to Banez et al., a Pope would not cease being Pope simply by being a heretic.  The legal membership of a Pope or indeed any bishop continues even after they separate themselves through heresy.  There needs to be a trial.  In the case of the Pope, what group could determine this and who would call it.  The old exceptions to the Pope's authority in calling a Council (found in anti-Conciliarist discussions) apply when the Pope is guilty of heresy (or apostasy) or schism.  Examples are Constance and the group in Rome that deposed Pope Marcellinus (whether it happened or not, people thought that it did).  Practically speaking, I don't know how anything like that could work after 1917, but I know nothing of canon law.   With respect to the matter under discussion, I don't see how a watertight case could be made that the conditions exist.  Moreover, I doubt that there is a cadre of good bishops out there ready to defend Catholic teaching against much of the Catholic establishment, including their fellow bishops.  They just aren't there and ready to be controversial.  It is how they have been selected, maybe at least in part for good reason.  It seems clear to me that the teaching on the intrinsic evil of contraceptive acts is necessary for salvation.  But the only ones defending it publicly and loudly have been lay people and priests  (Smith, Brugger, National Catholic Bioethics Center).  Moreover, I haven't heard any episcopal comments on the errors of some of the new non-magisterial documents and statements.  As the recent Synod discussions indicated, there is widespread error concerning "quae pertinent ad commune ovium sibi creditarum salutem." It is like living in the fourth century.  

When is it a duty to correct prelates?

Christian Brugger's piece in the National Catholic Register today brought to mind St. Thomas's statement that "ubi immineret periculum fidei, etiam publice essent praelati a subditis arguendi."  (ST. II-II, q. 3, art. 4, ad 2).  

Has anyone seen reputable discussions of what qualifies as "ubi immineret periculum fidei"?  Or who is obliged to correct?  I can't imagine that everyone would be obliged to correct their bishop and the Pope, even if they were required to privately reject the expressed behavior or position.  Nevertheless, it might apply widely, since, as Thomas says in the response, "correctio fraterna, quae est actus caritatis, pertinet ad unumquemque respectu cuiuslibet personae ad quam caritatem debet habere, si in eo aliquid corrigibile inveniatur."

I am sure that Brugger's behavior is correct.  I am wondering whether it is obligatory on some, and whether it counts as fraternal correction or not.  

Brugger's piece is here: http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/pope-francis-and-contraception-a-troubling-scenario/

Thomas Aquinas and Judaism

Anyone interested in “The Gifts and the Calling of God are Irrevocable” might also be interested in Matthew Levering, Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas: http://www.amazon.com/Christs-Fulfillment-Torah-Temple-Salvation/dp/0268022739/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1449846803&sr=8-1&keywords=levering+torah+temple

Unlike the recent non-magisterial document, Thomas's view is based on a sound interpretation of Scripture and Catholic belief.  The document more or less either ignores or sets aside the important distinctions and issues that Thomas addresses.

St. Thomas says Gay is OK?

Does anybody know if this description of Fr. Oliva's book is accurate?  I haven't been able to get my hands on a copy.  With the media and blogs now, I don't know what to believe.  Should we just classify it with reports that the Pope is a heretic on the subjects of marriage, the sacraments, and communion for non-Catholics?

https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/prominent-dominican-friar-publishes-book-claiming-thomas-aquinas-said-homos

Someone just sent this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHDneuvg7Vo&feature=youtu.be.  Unless I don't understand what he is saying, the President of the Leonine Commission rejects the Catholic faith and lacks a basic understanding of philosophical issues in natural philosophy and ethics.  Incredible.  If you don't have time to watch the whole thing, it descends into a completely confused silliness around 13:32.  But who has time to waste any more effort on it?

Gonet on Bellarmine Text

Does anyone know if Gonet is right that the German Jesuits inserted the disparaging remarks on Thomism in Bellarmine's De libero arbitrio I.12?   Gonet discusses this in the Apologia Thomistarum, art. 6, nn. 97-98.  First, changes to the text by German Jesuits are brought up in the life of Bellarmine by Fuligatus and Sylvester a Petra Sancta.  Second, there is a discrepancy between the 1593 Lyons edition and the 1608 Paris edition.  Third, as the text stands, Bellarmine seems to contradict himself later in l4. 16.  The texts are online, but I don't know if someone since then might have addressed or discussed the issue.  Is it plausible?

Cannibalism and Thomism

Does anyone know of any good Thomistic accounts of the cannibalism in the Andes?  See http://www.catholicnews.com/data/movies/08mv177.htm  I see that some bishops said that it was OK, but I haven't seen any sophisticated treatment of it.  I am wondering if some people consider cannibalism maybe as a side issue in some articles on sins against nature or intrinsically evil acts.

Is it Ok to eat meat from an already dead person to save Anne Frank?  This seems to me possibly different from lying or buggering a hen in order to save Anne Frank.

There is a lot on lying and Ann Frank.  For the moral issues involved with hen buggering, see (or even better, don't see)  http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/2001----.htm

Hitchcock on Semi-Pelagianism as Orthodoxy

James Hitchock's History of the Catholic Church (p. 94) states that semi-Pelagianism "despite its name, in effect came to define Catholic orthodoxy."  I have suspected that many or most "orthodox" Catholics in our dark times are materially semi-Pelagians.  Here is evidence.

On a related note, we seem to be prohibited from calling Molina Semi-Pelagian.  DS 2564 (31 Jul 1748)"The followers of Molina and Suarez are condemned by their adversaries as Semi-Pelagians. But the Roman Pontiffs have not passed judgment on the Molinist system, which they [followers of Molina and Suarez] presently defend and may continue to do so. "